israelhayom –
There is no doubt that the failure of the Houthi missiles directed at Israel to achieve the goal of pressuring the United States to force Israel to stop its pursuit of the terrorist Hamas movement in the Gaza Strip played a vital role in escalating Iranian signals by targeting Israeli ships and then expanding the circle to include all ships heading to Israel, in the framework of a series of carefully calculated Iranian steps that are unmistakable to an observer, as part of an Iranian deterrence strategy aimed at resolving the strategic conflict in the Middle East to its advantage.
Expanding the circle of conflict regionally is the content of most Iranian statements since the outbreak of the conflict in Gaza. On October 24, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian warned that “the Middle East region would spiral out of control” if Israel did not stop its attacks on the Gaza Strip.
At a press conference in Tehran, Abdullahian said: “I warn the United States and its agent Israel, if they do not stop the war, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Gaza, everything is possible at any moment, and it could put the region out of control.”
Although American concern focused on the possibility of igniting Israel’s northern front, Iran chose the lesser of the two “harms” from the standpoint of geopolitical calculations. Especially with regard to the repercussions of any escalation of the situation regionally on Iran, which has absolutely no desire to engage directly in a wide military conflict with the United States or Israel.
It also realizes that there is a very high possibility of destroying Hezbollah’s operational capabilities in light of the stationing of a huge American naval force in the Mediterranean, which included two aircraft carriers, and support ships, and about two thousand Marines to help deter any attacks launched by Hezbollah against Israel on an expanded basis.
Therefore, Iran chose to send lighter signals regarding its threats to expand the circle of conflict in the Middle East through the Bab al-Mandab Gate and the “Houthi” arm, which is less strategically costly according to Iranian calculations.
There is no doubt that the failure of the Houthi missiles directed at Israel to achieve the goal of pressuring the United States to force Israel to stop its pursuit of the terrorist Hamas movement in the Gaza Strip played a vital role in escalating Iranian signals by targeting Israeli ships and then expanding the circle to include all ships heading to Israel, in the framework of a series of carefully calculated Iranian steps that are unmistakable to an observer, as part of an Iranian deterrence strategy aimed at resolving the strategic conflict in the Middle East to its advantage.
Thus, the idea of Arab-Israeli normalization will be completely ended and the position of the “axis of resistance” will be strengthened, in addition to achieving other very important strategic goals that Tehran has long sought, such as “expelling Western fleets from territorial waters.”
In light of the above, it can be said that the scenario of expanding the scope of the conflict regionally is possible to some degree according to the calculations of Iranian policy planners, their interests, their vision of things, and the calculations of profit and loss in what is happening, whether in Gaza or the rest of the other points of tension, such as the Lebanese-Israeli border or the Red Sea.
But in all circumstances, the possibility of heating up these points remains very likely, especially if Israel comes close to achieving its goals in the Gaza Strip, which means eliminating one of Iran’s most important arms in the Middle East.
All of this explains the high level of interference of terrorist sectarian militias in Iraq and Syria in the circle of hellish conflict that Iran runs through agents and a network of gelatinous relationships that are difficult to verify, despite the proven alliances and the clarity of the network of relationships with certain evidence between Tehran and its agents.
Iran realizes that the intervention of its terrorist militia arms in the region under the pretext of defending the people of Gaza contributes to attracting the sympathy of the Arab and Islamic peoples and prevents the governments of these countries from uttering the facts and confronting the Iranian deceptive plan, which contains something contrary to what it declares.
Therefore, Tehran acts with relative ease, and operates in a relatively favorable strategic environment, as it has succeeded in transferring pressure to Arab and Western capitals, in addition to Israel, of course. However, Iran has no desire at all – at least at the present time – to raise the level of conflict and tension in a way that might open the door. In the face of strategic calculation errors – which puts it in a forced position to directly defend a major regional arm such as the Lebanese Hezbollah.
Therefore, expanding the circle of conflict will be done in a very cautious manner, and does not aim to actually expand the conflict, but rather to increase pressure on regional and international parties.
With the Hezbollah front tactically oscillating between highs and lows in the pace of confrontation on the border with Israel and continuing to broadcast ambiguous messages in a way that prevents the party from being subjected to a major military strike from both the United States and Israel.
This may force Iran to intervene directly to prevent the collapse of the power of Hezbollah, which is its most important and largest investment in the Middle East.
There is no doubt that Iran has chosen to exert pressure from the gateway to the “soft underbelly” of the global economy, which is the global trade movement through Bab al-Mandab and the Red Sea, and it is confident that this gateway will not likely lead to direct confrontations with the Iranians.
Dealing with it will be by confronting the danger to which commercial ships are exposed, and protecting them without engaging in a direct confrontation with the Houthi militias.
None of the major countries want to get involved in Yemen, and they are fully aware that this goal may be the focus of Iranian interest. It may also be welcomed by other strategic competitors in the context of the ongoing global competition and struggle for hegemony and influence, the redrawing of the rules of the global order in the post-pandemic phase, and the ongoing conflicts in vital regions such as Ukraine, Gaza, and others.
The result of all of this is what we see now and what confirms that the possibilities of expanding the circle of conflict regionally are unfortunately in the hands of Iran.
All of these are indicators that as long as this network of terrorist militia arms exists, the possibility of expanding conflicts will remain, regardless of Gaza or its people.
The real dilemma will remain in Iran’s agents and arms, which operate within a clear framework of joint coordination and the increasing organizational, intellectual, and ideological connections between these terrorist militias and each other, to the point that they are now threatening to ignite regional wars whenever they want and from any gate they want!